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Itô Jinsai e= (1627–1705) numbers among those Edo-period Confucian
scholars who have attracted considerable attention in Japan as well as among
non-Japanese researchers. Yet, for all his importance there had not been an
extensive translation from his works.1 This situation now has been remedied
by the publication of John A. Tucker’s complete translation of the Philosophical
Lexicography of the Analects and Mencius 4¬H (Gomô jigi)2, one of
Jinsai’s major works.
1. Introduction
In his dissertational thesis Tucker had traced the influence of Chen Beixi’s
¦& (1159–1223) The Meaning of Confucian Terms i³H (Xingli ziyi)
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1 For partial translations cf. SPAE, Joseph John: Itô Jinsai. A Philosopher, Educator, and
Sinologist of the Tokugawa Period, Monumenta Serica Monograph 12, Peiping: The
Catholic University of Peking 1948; LEINSS, Gerhard: Japanische Anthropologie. Die
Natur des Menschen in der konfuzianischen Neoklassik am Anfang des 18. Jahrhunderts.
Jinsai und Sorai (Izumi, vol. 2), Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz Verlag 1995.
2 Hereafter referred to as GJ. Number of pages given in round brackets.
3 The ninth chapter, “Jinsai’s Gomô jigi,” had dealt with Jinsai’s “conceptual repertory.”
John Allen TUCKER: Pei-hsi’s Tzu-i and the Rise of Tokugawa Philosophical Lexicography,
University of Michigan 1990 (PhD thesis): 245–80. Cf. also by the same author “Chen
Peixi, Lu Xiangshan, and Early Tokugawa (1600–1867) Philosophical Lexicography,”
Philosophy East & West 43.4 (1993): 683–713. Another article dealing with some aspects
of Jinsai’s thought appeared as “Ghosts and Spirits in Tokugawa Japan. The Confucian
Views of Itô Jinsai,” Japanese Religions 21.2 (1996): 229–51.
on Japanese Confucian scholars in the first half of the Edo-period.3 He “ended
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up tracing the emergence of a hitherto unnoticed Tokugawa genre, that of
philosophical lexicography, born shortly after the arrival of Beixi’s Ziyi in
Japan in the late-sixteenth century”4 with a “textual and philosophical con-
nection” between the original by Beixi and the Japanese works modeled after
it.5 (ix) This observation has strong repercussions on Tucker’s assessment of
Jinsai’s philosophy in the book under review here.
The “Introduction” attempts nothing less than a reevaluation of Jinsai’s
thought as such: “In seventeenth-century intellectual history, Itô Jinsai stands
out as the Confucian scholar who articulated, most subtly and systematically,
a socio-political vision primarily reflecting assumptions, ethical concerns,
and material interests most characteristic of chônin, or that hereditary estate
including merchants, artisans, and townspeople generally.” (1) Whereas Jinsai
commonly is known for his professed return to ancient Confucian ideas as
expressed in the Confucian Analects »4 (Lunyu) and the Mencius ¬C
(Mengzi) and his attack on the metaphysically tinged reformulation of Con-
fucianism by scholars of Song-dynasty China like Zhu Xi TÃ (1130–1200),
Tucker sets Jinsai in his historical background stressing his intimate relationship
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4 The works that Tucker mentions as written under the influence of the Ziyi — Fujiwara
Seika’s/ÁÆ (1561–1619) Human Nature and Principle explained in Japanese ª
i³ (Kana seiri), Hayashi Razan’s µ²@ (1583–1657) Vernacular Explanation of
[Beixi’s] Meaning of Human Nature and Principle i³H0 (Seiri jigi genkai),
Matsunaga Sekigo’s ÊS3 (1592–1657) Ethics Primer ¾´] (Irin shô), Yamaga
Sokô’s@Mu; (1622–85) Compendium of Sagely Teachingsn!±º (Seikyô yôroku),
GJ, Ogyû Sorai’s m¿À (1666–1728) Discerning Names£ª (Benmei) and others –
have been known to and commented upon by scholars for a long time. Tucker’s achievement
lies in drawing attention to similarities between them and the Ziyi – although they consid-
erably differ in length and number of key concepts discussed – as well as grouping them
together as examples of an independent genre which he calls “philosophical lexicography.”
5 Tucker concedes that the connection between Ziyi and GJ “was somewhat familiar to at
least several Japanese scholars.” He does not give the names of these scholars here and
only mentions SHIMIZU later on. (23–24) SHIMIZU Shigeru: “Kaidai”  (Bibliographical
notes), YOSHIKAWA, SHIMIZU 1971: 622–31. The use of “somewhat” makes Tucker’s
claim an understatement. KOYASU Nobukuni Cq¥ stressed the links between both
texts and characterized Jinsai’s choice of words and way of modelling his arguments on
the Ziyi as “parodizing” Beixi’s text. KOYASU Nobukuni: Itô Jinsai. Jinrin teki sekai no
shisô e=. d´gDy (Itô Jinsai. Thought of a world of human ethics),
Tôkyô Daigaku Shuppan Kai 1982: 55. Already KAIZUKA Shigeki «V noticed that
the GJ not only had taken the Ziyi as a model for its structure, but as a “departing point” in
its philosophical contents. KAIZUKA Shigeki: “Nihon jukyô no sôshi sha” §U!v
BR (The founder of Japanese Confucianism): Itô Jinsai e= (Nihon no meichô,
vol. 13), Chûô Kôron Sha 1972: 17–18, 22.
with one social stratum, that of artisans and merchants, as opposed to that of
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samurai. Jinsai’s thought appears as an “implicit critique” of “various attempts
by samurai theorists to redefine Neo-Confucianism along lines which both
flattered, socially and politically, and further empowered, at least intellectually,
the warrior estate.”6 (1) Tucker considers his teachings to have been “politically
potent” as they – “implicitly” – “provided a socially legitimizing, uplifting
ethic for townspeople and other non-samurai by affirming their full ethical
parity with all people, especially samurai who claimed to be their superiors.”7
(3) The “challenging socio-political edge” (3), that laid beneath the “lexico-
graphic surface” of Jinsai’s writings, was “seriously at odds” with the as-
sumptions of the ruling warrior estate.8 (3) Underpinning this interpretation
of the political dimensions of Jinsai’s thought is a view of Edo-period society
in which a “bakufu-decreed social system relegated chônin to the bottom of
society.”9 (59)
A second major theme which is closely welded together with the first to
form a coherent reading of Jinsai’s life-work in Tucker’s account is the
reevaluation of Jinsai’s place in the Edo-period history of thought with respect
to Song-Confucian learning. The delineation of distinct, even antagonistic
schools of thought in Edo-period Confucianism has its roots among Edo-period
Confucian scholars.10 Inoue Tetsujirô’s 
^K¸ (1855–1944) work did
much to put the classification of schools on an academic basis.11 Since then
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06 In places Tucker exerts some caution in expressing his views. He concedes that Jinsai’s
interpretation was “not specifically chônin in outlook,” but neither “hardly exclusive to
samurai.” (1)
07 Parts of a “significant alternative worldview” (1) that appealed – “albeit tacitly” – to
“most intellectually informed chônin” (1) were Jinsai’s notions “about the material vitality
of things, his insistence on the natural integrity of human feelings and desires, his recognition
of the universal ethical importance of self-cultivation, and his admission of a circumscribed
realm of spiritual engagement.” (1)
08 Jinsai privileged the “welfare and wishes of ‘the people’.” (3, 7)
09 Contrary to Tucker’s claim there was no government decree that made the division of
society into status groups mandatory, nor did authorities prescribe that “merchants” should
be considered the lowest of these groups deserving least in respect. If in reality there was
a marked differentiation of social or rather occupational groups this was due to developments
that had already started during the period of internal strife in the 15th and 16th centuries.
10 Cf. Hirose Tansô’s 8hz (1782–1856) Evaluation of the Grove of Confucian Scholars
Uµ (Jurin hyô) (Nihon jurin sôsho §UµwY, vol. 3), Ôtori Shuppan Sha 1971
(reprint 11889).
11 INOUE Tetsujirô: Nihon kogaku ha no tetsugaku §1 (The Philosophy of
the Japanese School of Ancient Learning), Fuzan Bô 1902.
this taxonomy has kept its place in the historiography of thought with Jinsai
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as a member of the School of Ancient Learning 1 (Kogaku), that advocated
a direct study of the earliest scriptures of the Confucian tradition and criticized
the mitigating influence of Song-learning.
Tucker holds that Jinsai’s attack on Song Confucianism is motivated by his
merchant background: it is not so much an attack on the work of Song-dynasty
scholars as such but rather on the “samurai-inspired social distortion of Neo-
Confucianism.” (60) For this purpose alone Jinsai’s revision is cast in the
form of a return to the “egalitarian themes in Confucius’ thought.”12 (60)
These, however, are consistent with the teachings of Zhu Xi and other Song-
dynasty scholars as well. Seen in this perspective, Jinsai only “nominally
differentiated” his teachings from those of Song-learning, “not because of
irreconcilable differences with it.” (60)
Unfortunately, however, modern Japanese studies13 “often celebrate Jinsai’s
ostensible rejection of the metaphysically sophisticated version of Neo-
Confucianism,” thereby reflecting “an early twentieth-century bias chronic
among Japanese scholars toward philosophies traceable to China.” (17) Many
“Western scholars”14 uncritically followed this stance as if it were beyond
doubt. (17) That it is not, as Tucker points out, can be made evident by
comparing Jinsai’s treatment of concepts that figure prominently in Song-
learning as well as in his own vision. What influenced Edo-period Confucian
scholars was the definition of Song-Confucian key concepts by Zhu Xi’s
student Chen Beixi in The Meaning of Confucian Terms. At the beginning of
the Edo-period, Hayashi Razan appropriated this text for his own exposition
of Confucianism. This thread connecting Japanese scholars with Beixi via
Razan includes Jinsai, too. Tucker succinctly states that Jinsai’s “system
sprang as much from the early-Tokugawa Zhu Xi School of Neo-Confucianism,
and especially the semantically liberal teachings of Hayashi Razan, as it did
from the ancient texts which were supposedly the semantic foundations of
the Gomô jigi: the Analects and the Mencius.” (18) It cannot be denied, of
course, that the GJ contains an antagonistic stance towards Song-learning.
For this, too, Tucker offers an explanation: “To the extent that it criticized
Neo-Confucianism, the Gomô jigi did so in explicit opposition to the seemingly
Japonica Humboldtiana 3 (1999)
12 Probably for Tucker this means moral perfectiability of every human being and welfare of
the whole people as the highest aims of government.
13 Tucker does not give any names or titles. The same on p. 25.
14 Again, names or titles are missing.
narrow and, in Jinsai’s view, rather misguided philosophical claims expounded
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by Yamazaki Ansai [...]”15 as one of those “samurai theorists” who allegedly
redefined Song-Confucianism “to serve the socio-political ends of bushi do-
mination.” (18) Even if Jinsai’s “semantic analyses” sometimes oppose those
offered by Zhu Xi, Beixi, and Razan, often they follow from them. (24–5)
Therefore, the GJ should not so much be understood as a “doctrinaire anti-
Neo-Confucian work,” but rather as one “furthering the semantic project
advocated by Beixi and Razan via critical revision of existing philosophical
lexicography.”16 (25) What then makes Jinsai an eminent figure of Edo-period
Confucianism was not his antiquitarian treatment of Confucian concepts and
refutation of Song-learning. Rather it has to be looked at in the impetus
Jinsai gave to Confucian discourse in Japan, broadening its outlook and
opening it up to strata of society other than the samurai only.17 (62)
2. Translation18
In the foreword Tucker explains his method of translation: “In order to
maximize its accessibility, I have steered away from the awkward literalist
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15 Tucker does not support this claim of “explicit” critique of Yamazaki Ansai’s @>=
(1619–82) thought by pointing out relevant passages in his translation. As a matter of fact,
Ansai – at least by name – does not figure in the GJ at all. Jinsai’s attacks are invariably
levelled against Cheng Yi, Zhu Xi, Chen Beixi and other exponents of Song-Confucianism
in China.
16 Tucker points out similarities in the way Beixi and Jinsai treated topics central to both like
the stress on “generative force” as against “principle” ³ (ri) (53) or the positive evaluation
of “human feelings” d_ (ninjô) (28). In the end, for Tucker the “difference between
Jinsai’s ontology and Zhu Xi’s is, therefore, one of relative emphasis rather than real
kind.” (26)
17 The advent of Confucian studies since the beginning of the 16th century marks a shift in
the outlook of philosophical discourse. The “embrace of more ethically and politically
well-defined uses of philosophical language [by Seika, Razan etc.] reflected a decisive
intellectual and cultural shift towards an ontologically real and substantial order that was
radically discontinuous with the ontic emptiness of Buddhist discourse. Jinsai’s Gomô jigi
was decisive in influencing this shift because, in addition to its fresh, vitalistic metaphysics
mirroring the new realism of the age, it implicitly precluded samurai domination of the
nascent order” (62) Tucker speaks of Jinsai reconceiving “the Japanese polity along civil,
essentially secular, and philosophically humanitarian lines.” (64)
18 The translation follows the NST edition of GJ. Cf. p. xiii. YOSHIKAWA Kôjirô r7K
¸, SHIMIZU Shigeru lf« (eds.): Itô Jinsai, Itô Tôgaie= (Itô Jinsai
and Itô Tôgai) (NST, vol. 33), Iwanami Shoten 1971. It is based on the printed edition of
1705 (Hôei ¤ 2). Reference to this edition will be made as “NST, page number” in the
main text.
approach, towards one which both translates and interprets the work, making
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it as transparent as possible.” (xiii) This is coupled with the hope that “many
if not most interested readers will have, or will be developing, the language
skills necessary to read the original text in Japanese.” (xiii)
Tucker has discharged his responsibility in an impressive manner. As a
first glance will instantly reveal, his translation is immensely readable and
gives a faithful rendering of Jinsai’s thought. However, there are mistakes,
and the decision to steer “away from the awkward literal approach” has
consequences that deserve some comments.
2.1 Preface
1. The second character in the original text written in Chinese is [ (jô, shô /
katsute) meaning “formerly,” “in the past.” Thus, while a literal translation
of the first sentence starts “When I formerly taught students,” Tucker chooses
the present tense (“I teach students”). 2. Jinsai uses binominal expressions –
ishi gomyaku 	D4© and imi ketsumyaku 	¨)© – central to his method
of argumentation. Each consists of two independent terms of complementary
nature. Both expressions are synonymous, with gomyaku (“vein of words”)
and ketsumyaku (“blood veins”) signifying fundamental categories like “hu-
maneness” e (jin) and “rightness”  (gi) that run through the Analects and
Mencius, and ishi (“intent”) or imi (“purport”) refering to the general orientation
or meaning of Confucius’ and Mencius’ thought as they result from the
fundamental categories.19 Tucker’s translation makes short thrift with both
expressions without accounting for the independent meaning of their constitu-
ent parts although his own translation of the fourth paragraph in Chapter XX,
“Learning,” suggests that imi and ketsumyaku are distinct in meaning. (187–8)
Thus, he gives ishi gomyaku as “semantic lineage,” while the even more
central imi ketsumyaku loses its distinctness in Tucker’s translation of Kô Mô
no imi ketsumyaku5¬	¨)© as “semantic lineage of Confucian-Mencian
philosophical notions.” Some aspects of imi ketsumyaku are expressed by
“semantic lineage” whereas others seem to be contained in “philosophical
notions.” 3. In the following sentence another key term in Jinsai’s exposition
– jigiH – is rendered as “meanings.” In the context of Tucker’s translation
grammatically it relates to “philosophical notions” in the preceding phrase,
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19 For a view that interprets both as distinct notions cf. ISHIDA Ichirô p¸: Itô Jinsai
e= (Itô Jinsai) (Jinbutsu sôsho, vol. 39), Yoshikawa Kôbun Kan 1973: 130–31.
however, although Jinsai uses it as a generic term in the sense of “meaning
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of words / characters.” In the following sentence it appears as “philological
matters.” Thus it goes unnoticed that the same jigi is used in both cases. 4.
The next but one sentence starts with “Too few scholars study such philological
matters.” Tucker translates the character \ (shô) as “few.” However, it
means “small” or “small thing” and takes on the meaning of “precondition”
here. Therefore, the sentence should be read as “For the learning of the
meaning of words / characters this of course is a basic precondition” H
­2\Ä (sore jigi no gakumon ni okeru makoto ni shô nari), “this”
refering to the recognition of fundamental categories and the general orientation
of thought in the Analects and Mencius (ishi gomyaku) as well as the exhortation
not to miconstrue the “meaning of words / characters” mentioned in the
sentence before. 5. Tucker’s translation of the next sentence concerns the
understanding of “semantic lines” (not “lineages” anymore), while the original
subject – the discussion of the “meaning of words / characters” – is obscured.20
Actually the text says in a more literal rendering: “If in every single case [of
elucidating the meaning of words / characters] one would take the Analects
and Master Meng for a base and bring it into accord with their general
thought (ishi) and fundamental categories (gomyaku), it would be proper.”
2.2 General remarks
The other paragraphs by far do not elicit as many comments as the “Preface.”
For the most part Tucker offers sound translations. However, there are some
peculiarities the reader should be aware of.
2.2.1 Insertions. It is common practice in academic translations to insert
words or even whole parts of a sentence where the original lacks in transparency
and to make them easily recognizable with square brackets. Tucker does not
follow this convention. The last two sentences of the first paragraph of
Chapter II, “The Way of Heaven,” e.g. contain two insertions. Jinsai describes
Zhu Xi’s notion of the “great ultimate” ~" (taikyoku; C: taiji) and states in
the second but last sentence of this paragraph that Zhu Xi “considered the
great ultimate the most highest.” While the Chinese philosopher in Jinsai’s
Japonica Humboldtiana 3 (1999)
20 Tucker translates this sentence together with the following as “Detailed studies of the
Analects and Mencius facilitate an accurate understanding of the semantic lines (ishi
gomyaku	D4©) of those sagely texts, and keep students from erratically manipulating
them by trying to impose their own subjective views (shikenE,) on them.”
reading accorded the “great ultimate” the highest position in his cosmological
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conception, Tucker translates this part as “Zhu Xi believed that the notion of
the great ultimate [...] conveyed Confucius’ highest teaching [...],” thus in-
serting “Confucius” and “teaching” and giving the text an interpretation not
warranted by the original alone. (72) The next sentence of Tucker’s translation
reads: “Zhu Xi then imposed that interpretation on the ‘Appended Judgments’
(Keiji (È) of the Book of Changes which so clearly states ‘yin alternating
with yang refers to the way’.” (73) The original, however, just states literally:
“This is the reason that being at odds with the meaning of the ‘Appended
Judgments’ is so extreme.” Obviously the difference between Zhu Xi’s inter-
pretation and the passage in the Book of Changes is alluded to here.
Insertions of logical components required in the target language are common
practice even if they contain the translator’s interpretation. However, Tucker
not only resorts to this kind of insertion but often adds complete sentences to
the original even if they do not bear information necessary to make Jinsai’s
text intelligible. At best they smoothen the narrative or remind the reader of
certain points made earlier. To the end of the fourth paragraph of Chapter VI,
“Humaneness, Rightness, Propriety, & Wisdom” (121) the translator adds:
“Confucius and Mencius offered many other teachings about humaneness,
rightness, propriety, and wisdom that equally illustrate these themes.” Or
consider the following insertion near the end of the fourth paragraph of
Chapter VIII, “Human Nature”: “Without trying to understand the teachings
of Confucius and Mencius fully, the Neo-Confucians forced their substance-
function dichotomy onto the sagely Confucian writings.” (139) While these
insertions make for transparency in Tucker’s light, Jinsai’s mode of thought
is obscured by them. Similar unmarked insertions of various length can be
found in other places, too.
2.2.2 Omissions. At the beginning of the third paragraph of Chapter I, “The
Way of Heaven,” Jinsai tries to prove the all-pervasiveness of the “unitary
generative force” (Tucker’s translation for .Â ichi genki) by describing
what happens in an empty wooden box. Although nothing is inside the box
and it is closed by the top, “generative force” fills it, so that “mold” and even
“termites” are born inside. What occurs inside this box also happens in the
whole world at large, as “Heaven and Earth” are “one gigantic box” ¼
(ichi daikyô) themselves, and yin and yang act as the “generative force”
within the box. (NST, 16) Where Jinsai explains how a box is put together
from “six pieces” ¹¡ (han roppen), Tucker translates “A box-maker
makes a box by piecing together wood,” omitting the number of parts used
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for construction, but adding the box-maker. (73) That a box is put together
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by using six pieces of wood is not important by itself. However, it would
have given a touch of narrativeness to keep this tiny facet. A whole subclause
is omitted from a sentence in the second paragraph of Chapter X, “Human
Feelings.” Tucker translates “If the minds (or sensibilities) of compassion,
shame, deference, and right and wrong are not parts of the mind, what are
they?”21, thus leaving out “that is to say something that has got a clearly
visible form” -t®%R (sunawachi kenzen to shite katachi aru mono)
after “parts of the mind.” (NST, 138)
2.2.3 Inconsistencies. In some cases Tucker chooses different expressions in
English to translate the same Japanese word. The translation of kokoro as
“mind” or “minds (or sensibilities)” is an example in case. “Moral mind”
(153) as a third variant. This might not be considered a serious inconsistency,
but that cannot be said in cases where variations in the translations for one
and the same expression obscure key concepts in Jinsai’s text. One such
concept is gi  or “rightness” as Tucker translates it in most places (e.g.
115). However, when gi appears in the ninth paragraph of Chapter II, “The
Decree of Heaven,” it is translated as “morality” (p. 90: lines 11, 25; p. 91:
8), “moral issues” (p. 90: 14, 17; p. 91: 2), “morally” (p. 90: 29), “rightfully”
(p. 90: 32), and “moral practice” (p. 91: 11). The character for this concept
and the Japanese reading gi is only given in line 2 on page 91. One of the
central concepts of Jinsai’s whole philosophy is jindô d or the “way of
humanity” as Tucker translates the term on p. 93 (but “way of man” on p.
101). However, without reading Tucker’s translation in comparison with the
original, the reader would never surmise that this key term also hides behind
“human affairs” on p. 94, the expression incidentally used on the same page
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21 This sentence calls for another remark on the translation of kokoro ` as “minds (or
sensibilities),” literally “heart.” On the same page and in other contexts Tucker renders
kokoro as “mind” in the singular. This is a key concept of the GJ to which the whole of
Chapter VII is devoted. There it is defined in the first sentence: “The mind is the faculty
with which people think and plan” (Tucker’s translation, 129). Now, kokoro here is the
same kokoro as in the sentence under discussion which should be read: “If thus the heart,
[that harbours] compassion and pity, shame and repugnance, modesty and deference, and
[the sense for ] right and wrong [inside it], that is to say something that has got a clearly
visible form, is not [considered] the heart, then what is it?” NST, 58. Cf. LEINSS 1995:
213.
22 Where jindô or hito no michi d is mentioned in the same paragraph Tucker gives
“way of humanity.”
as translation for jinji dG or, literally, “the affairs of human [beings].”22
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2.2.4 Errors. Occasionally Tucker’s translation is mistaken. The reader might
consider the following passage:
Immoral behavior (fuzen s), insofar as it exists in the world, even consists of actions
like transplanting a mountain plant in a marsh, or relocating fish on top of a mountain or
hill. Under such circumstances, neither the plant nor the fish could follow their natures for
even one day.
The inability of people to be immoral for an entire day reveals the inherent goodness of
heaven’s way. (78f.)
Giving the transplantation of a mountain plant in a marsh or the relocation of
fish on a mountaintop as examples of immoral behaviour sounds nonsensical.
But it only sounds this way as Tucker altered the underlying structure of this
sentence. Literally the passage reads:
Existing between heaven and earth [i.e. in the world] by wrong-doing [literally not-goodness]
is the same as planting a mountain plant in a marsh or leaving a water dweller f|
(suizoku) on top of a mountain or hill; that is to say: it is inevitable that they cannot live
out their nature for even a single day. That man, too, by wrong-doing cannot stand
between heaven and earth even for one day is the same [as with the plant and the water
animal]. (NST, 117)
The translation of  (tsû zezu) as “misunderstood” in a sentence from the
discussion of “propriety” ¶ (rei) in the tenth paragraph of Chapter VI,
“Humaneness, Rightness, Propriety, & Wisdom,” does not fully meet Jinsai’s
intention. Jinsai argues about the standard for proper behaviour in concrete
situations. “Ancient [rules of] propriety” 1¶ (korei) often do not fit contem-
porary circumstances. Everyday “common [rules of] propriety” {¶ (zokurei)
will not do either. The next sentence in Tucker’s translation reads: “On the
other hand, Chinese (Kanrei Å) rites are often misunderstood. Still the
common and familiar rites of this country lack any significance.”23 (125)
However, what Jinsai says is not that Chinese “[rules of] propriety” are
misunderstood in Japan, which implies a mistaken interpretation on part of
the Japanese, but that they do not make sense in Japan because they are not
tailored to actual conditions there and thus do not fit for instant usage.
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23 Note that Tucker renders rei as “propriety” at the beginning of this paragraph, as “ancient
ceremonies” (korei) in combination with the character for “old,” as “vulgar rites” {¶
(zokurei) together with the character for “common,” as “Chinese rites” (Kanrei) together
with the character for “China,” and once again in combination with { (zoku) as “common
and familiar rites” (zokurei). For the sake of consistency I stuck to Tucker’s first suggestion,
“propriety,” and added “rules of” in square brackets where necessary.
Therefore the following translation is suggested: “Chinese [rules of] propriety
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often make no sense in this country [i.e. Japan], and common [rules of]
propriety have no significance from the outset.” (NST, 131) This interpretation
not only conforms to the commentary in the NST edition (NST, 44), but it
also accords with the following sentence where Jinsai states that the adjusting
of “[rules of] propriety” to contemporary circumstances needs a “brilliant
and accomplished refined person” ª$C (meitatsu no kunshi, Tucker’s
translation) to “use the old as standard as well as to take the present into
consideration, to follow the [customs of the] land” and so on.24
At the end of Appendix A, “The Great Learning is not a Confucian Text”
Jinsai explains that it is unknown who originally compiled the Great Learning
 (Daxue / Daigaku). He assumes that it may have been scholars from the
ancient Chinese states of Qi o and Lu ·. These scholars25 were well versed
in the Books of Poetry F' (Shijing / Shikyô)26 and HistoryY' (Shujing /
Shokyô), but did not know the “lineage of Confucius and Mencius.” The next
sentence inTucker’s translation reads: “Qi scholars rightly defined filial piety
(kô6), brotherly deference (tei), and compassion (jiI), and consideration
for others.” (235) However, in the original “Qi scholars” are not mentioned.
Instead it begins with }o (sono seika den ika) (NST, 161). Now,
the character o (sei) of course is the same as the one used for the name of
the state Qi, and  (ka) frequently means “scholar” or “school tradition.”
However, these deliberations are moot as o (seika den) has a fixed
meaning.27 Seika, or “to regulate the family,” refers to one of the famous
eight articles in the first part of the Great Learning28 (according to the
division established by Zhu Xi), and den indicates the commentaries on
single articles in the second part. A literal translation of Jinsai’s sentence
reads: “In the commentary on ‘regulating the family’ and the following [com-
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24 Tucker does not give an exact translation of this passage but renders it as “(i) pattern new
rites on ancient models, (ii) mesh those rites with local customs.” (125)
25 Tucker speaks of a single scholar although the original clearly gives a plural expression:
ZU (shoju). NST: 161.
26 Tucker gives the Japanese reading as Shikei on p. 209.
27 Tucker could have taken the meaning of seika den from the NST commentary if he had
not known from the beginning. Cf. NST: 100. Apparently, however, he did know it as
only a few lines onwards he correctly translates Jinsai’s quotation of the whole passage
from the Great Learning .
28 “In order rightly to govern the state, it is necessary first to regulate the family.” Cf.
SBBY: 1b, 2a, 7a–8a.
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entaries] that speak of filial piety, brotherly love, and compassion and discuss
the way of the measuring square, there are things I would abide with.”29
3. Evaluation
The assessment of Tucker’s exercise must turn on two issues, one textual the
other historiographical. Both domains subtract heavily from the achievement
of publishing a full translation of GJ. Everyone engaged in translation knows
the difficulty to produce a readable translation that still remains faithful to
the text. Making the original “as transparent as possible” in itself is a com-
mendable enterprise. Yet, if the translation explicitly addresses specialists as
well as students in the same area, a much more faithful approach is called
for. If the translation takes too much liberty with the original wording, as
Tucker’s does, the reader will still be obliged to have a look at the original
for himself as he never can be sure how interpretative the translation is rather
than literal. At best, the translation will be (not more than) a help to find an
exact rendering. So it is the freshman or the layman only who will be satisfied
with readability and transparency. This notwithstanding, the translation review-
ed here still is a valuable asset to the number of translations from the master-
works of Edo-period philosophers already in existence.
Historiographically, Tucker’s view of Edo-period society as consisting of
four status groups with the merchants as the least respected bottom segment
is problematic. In view of the level of discussion reached among historians
of Edo society it appears either hopelessly antiquated or ideologically motivat-
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29 In several places there are misses due to oversight. In the sentence “True wisdom (chi no
jitsu½) understands humaneness and propriety without neglecting them in practice”
(121) “propriety” should be “replaced” by “rightness” as Jinsai here refers to “humaneness”
and “rightness” mentioned in the preceding two sentences. On page 139 Tucker gave the
charactersX}Ç` but left out aete for  in the transliteration and wrote hoshiimama
forX with one “i” only. A mistake of the same order is giving the characters for the name
of King Liang of Zhou W as É instead of É. (247) In the introduction several
mistakes of the same order can be found as e.g. “Liebniz” instead of “Leibniz” on p. 24.
30 E.g. BITÔ Masahide k: “Tokugawa jidai no shakai to seiji shisô no tokushitsu” 
rJQjLO (The special character of society and political thought in
the Tokugawa period), Shisô Dy 685 (1981): 1–12; ASAO Naohiro 9: “Kinsei
no mibun to sono henyô” #gcË ¯ (Status in the early modern period and
its transformation), ASAO (ed.): Nihon no kinsei 7. Mibun to kakushiki §#g 7. c
ËN (Early modern Japan. Status and rank), Chûô Kôron Sha 1992: 7–40; SAITÔ
Yôichi=°, ÔISHI Shinzaburô pa?¸: Mibun sabetsu shakai no shinjitsucË
< Q bP
ed.30 There is no textual base for the pronounced opposition between merchants
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and samurai concerns as well as a hidden critique of social organization in
Jinsai’s thought.31 As a matter of fact this evaluation relies on conjecture
only (e.g. 33). The argument that Jinsai’s thought owed heavily to that of
Song-learning is not altogether new. Sakai Naoki had highlighted the degree
to which Jinsai’s thought drew on Zhu Xi parasitically.32 Gerhard Leinss,
too, concluded that “in view of the degree of the Song-Confucian inheritance
it becomes clear that Zhu Xi’s system of thought acts as the decisive point of
reference in Jinsai’s argumentation despite all his attacks.”33
However, Tucker’s attempt to delineate the degree to which Jinsai depended
on Song-Confucian themes and arguments has to be valued highly. It is an
important warning against any ready attempt to mark off distinct school
affiliations and a naive view of the alleged “Japanization” of Confucianism
during the Edo-period. On the other hand, in evaluating Jinsai’s thought on
the whole, these dependencies should not preclude any differences. Reconsider-
ing Jinsai within Song-learning is important to show up the range of possibilities
for interpretation within its discourse. But at the same time taking Jinsai’s
attacks on Song-learning seriously offers a chance to delineate how breaks
could develop in this discourse and how new lines of argumentation could
take their departure from within its folds!
Thus, Tucker’s work sets the stage for a fresh appraisal of Jinsai’s thought.
Focusing on the contribution of the social background to Jinsai’s philosophy
underlines the need to analyse a Confucian scholar’s work not only as a
monolithic unit devoid of context but to see it in relation to a surrounding set
of beliefs and preoccupations of thought shared by a broader social milieu,
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<QbP (The truth of society practising status discrimination) (Shinsho Edo
jidai, vol. 2), Kôdan Sha 1995. Edo-period status groups indicate (1) a community made
up of functions, (2) an agglomeration of individuals without an encompassing coherence.
In sociological terms, there was subordination, but not so ideologically.
31 Tucker’s identification of Song-learning with samurai-ideology, too, is open to discussion.
Cf. BITÔ Masahide: Nihon hôken shisô shi kenkyû §*DyA+  (Studies in the
feudal thought of Japan), Aoki Shoten 1963; WATANABE Hiroshi ¢:: Kinsei Nihon
shakai to Sô Gaku #g§Qx (Early modern Japanese society and Song-
learning), Tôkyô Daigaku Shuppan Kai 1985; OOMS, Herman: Tokugawa Ideology. Early
Constructs, 1570–1680, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1985.
32 SAKAI, Naoki: Voices of the Past. The Status of Language in Eighteenth-Century Japanese
Discourse, Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1992: 55.
33 Tucker mentions SAKAI 1992 in his bibliography but does not elaborate on his exposition
of Jinsai’s Song-legacy. LEINSS’ study is not even in the bibliography although it goes
into detail on Jinsai’s reliance on Zhu Xi in several places: pp. 86–87, 103–04, 108–12.
even if Tucker himself could only postulate this connection without drawing
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into relief the beliefs of Jinsai’s contemporaries. Stressing Jinsai’s reliance
on Song-Confucian conceptions, Tucker offered a possibility to do away
with long held beliefs in distinct schools of thought clinically set apart from
each other, opening up the way for sharpened sensibilities towards the degree
to which Confucian scholars in Edo-period Japan relied on Song-period con-
ceptions. This could result in a modification of earlier attempts to interpret
Jinsai’s ‘solution’ for a “Japanization” of Confucianism. By paying minute
attention to the method of argumentation, Jinsai’s use of Song-Confucian
concepts as well as the points where breaks occured – even on a small order
– and new paradigms of thought took shape will come into sharper focus.
Tucker’s book is a valuable opening to a discussion that hopefully will start
off from here.
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